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Mirrored Windows Theory and the
NYPD: Does Heavy Surveillance
Policing Translate into Greater Use
of Force?
Deborah A. Carroll
University of Illinois at Chicago
Broken Windows Theory stipulates a building with a broken window (representing minor
crimes and disorder in the community) will lead to more destruction and carelessness of
property (representing major violent crimes in the whole neighborhood) and has informed
policing policy since the 1990s. This paper coins the term Mirrored Windows Theory by
reversing the application of Broken Windows Theory and applying it to police officers to
examine whether greater prevalence of broken windows-type tactics in the form of heavy
surveillance policing leads to greater use of physical force by officers. Using panel data
(2009-2016) of all stop-and-frisk incidents and civilian complaints against New York City
police officers alleging use of physical force, Conditional Fixed Effects Negative Binomial
Regression is used for analysis. Results indicate increases in 1) stop-and-frisk incidents that
do not involve the use of physical force, and 2) civilian complaints for which police officers
are exonerated are associated with increases in officers’ actual use of physical force by
17.00% and 6.42%, respectively, within New York City neighborhoods on average. On the
other hand, civilian complaints alleging inappropriate use of force are associated with a
decrease in officers’ actual use of physical force by 4.84% within New York City
neighborhoods on average. These findings are robust while controlling for underlying
neighborhood crime and demographics of each neighborhood police precinct each year.
Keywords: Broken Windows Theory, Mirrored Windows Theory, Bureaucratic Discretion,
Negative Binomial Regression, Stop and Frisk, Heavy Surveillance Policing

Recently, Americans have become more acutely aware of police-civilian relations. Due to
magnified attention on the persisting witnessing of police violence, each new story that
surfaces divide communities on what feasible policy solutions exist for the problem. What
catalyzed the public outrage and calls for greater social justice—although not for the first
time—were primarily the deaths of Ahmaud Arbery in February 2020 and George Floyd in
May 2020. Activists then began to spotlight Breonna Taylor’s death, which went
uninvestigated for several months, as well as the case of Elijah McClain, almost a year after
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his death in 2019. Rayshard Brooks, Andres Guardado, Jacob Blake, Sean Monterrosa, and
Eric Salgado, make up only a small number of cases at the current forefront of community
protests and the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. What is primarily demanded at these
protests is accountability for, and the end to, fatal police violence, and a comprehensive
reform of the ethics, culture, and training that has potentially led to the current state of
aggressive policing.
The literature overwhelmingly shows that the likelihood of physical force being used
by police is higher for certain groups of people. For example, a recent study by Fryer (2017)
on racial differences in use of force by police found that on non-lethal uses of force, Black
and Latino people are greater than 50% more likely to experience some level of force in
interactions with police. Another study by Edwards, Lee, and Esposito (2019), which used
data on police-involved deaths to estimate how the risk of being killed by use of force in the
United States varies across social groups, found that “African American men and women,
American Indian/Alaska Native men and women, and Latino men face higher lifetime risk of
being killed by police than do their White peers” (p.16793), with the risk highest for Black
men who face about a 1 in 1,000 chance of being killed by police over their lifetime. The
study also found that the average lifetime odds of being killed by police are about 1 in 2,000
for men and about 1 in 33,000 for women, with risk peaks between the ages 20 and 35 for all
ethnic groups. Moreover, for young men of color, police use of force is among the leading
causes of death (Edwards et al., 2019). Interestingly, however, even though minorities are
disproportionately killed by police officers more frequently, research suggests that white
officers are not necessarily more likely to use lethal force than nonwhite officers (Menifield
et al., 2018).
Age, race, and gender have been the primary foci for understanding the policing and
legal systems used to decide “who to target, how to intervene, and how much force should be
applied in the process of policing” (Edwards et al., p.16793). However, as the aforementioned
cases of alleged police misconduct in the U.S. have essentially triggered the Black Lives
Matter movement and calls for greater social equity, it is important to consider other factors
that potentially explain the use of force by police officers. As is widely noted in extant
research, however, a primary obstacle to studying police use of force has been the lack of
comprehensive and readily available data. For example, The Vera Institute of Justice (2020)
found that only 50% of policing agencies in New York City reported their arrest data to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 2016. Gaps in availability of police data relating to
civilian interactions have been a point of contention in the ongoing calls for social justice
from those who claim that bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 2010) has led to varying levels of
alleged harassment and aggressive actions by law enforcement officers. However, with data
from the New York City (NYC) Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) becoming
publicly available for the first time ever in June of 2020, scholars are now better situated to
further examine this important issue of community policing. Specifically, it is now possible
to analyze civilian complaint data pertaining to the largest municipal police force in the nation
and one that often serves as a leader in shaping policing policy—the New York City Police
Department (NYPD). As such, this is one of the first academic studies to use these newly
available CCRB data for conducting research on the use of force by police officers.
Introduced by George Kelling and James Wilson (1982), Broken Windows Theory
(BWT) has informed and shaped policing policy since the 1990s. This theory stipulates that
a building with a broken window (representing minor crimes in a particular area and
symbolizing disorder in the community) will likely lead to more destruction and carelessness
of the property (representing major violent crimes in the whole neighborhood). This paper
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coins the term Mirrored Windows Theory by reversing the application of Broken Windows
Theory and applying it to police officers themselves to examine whether greater prevalence
of heavy surveillance policing, which often creates disorder within neighborhoods and among
their residents, leads to greater use of force by police officers in New York City. Using panel
data, this paper examines whether a greater number of 1) stop-and-frisk incidents that do not
involve the use of physical force, 2) more civilian complaints made against police officers
alleging inappropriate use of force, or 3) civilian complaints for which police officers are
exonerated are associated with the actual use of physical force by police while controlling for
underlying neighborhood crime and demographics of each neighborhood, which are defined
according to police precincts in NYC. On the basis of Mirrored Windows Theory, these
findings will help to inform policies on accountability for police behavior to deter more
aggressive and/or violent outcomes, as well as to improve training that aims to increase
respect for all communities and ultimately improve police-civilian relations.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the relevant literature on Broken
Windows Theory, which is the theoretical basis of this research, is discussed in terms of how
it has been used to inform policing practices in the U.S. and particularly in New York City.
In addition, the extant literature is discussed in terms of the implications of street-level
bureaucratic implementation of this approach to community policing and how the application
of Broken Windows Theory is reversed to the police. The data, model specification, and
methodology for testing the application of Mirrored Windows Theory and the primary
research question are then discussed. The final sections interpret the regression results and
discuss the implications of the findings, including suggested policy reforms for improving
community-police relations and achieving social justice going forward.
Broken Windows Theory and Its Role in Informing Policing Practices
A significant shift in policing took place in the 1990s after the introduction of the Broken
Windows Theory. Informed by social scientists George Kelling and James Wilson (1982),
the Broken Windows Theory stipulates that a building with a broken window (representing
minor crimes in a particular area and symbolizing disorder in the community) will inevitably
lead to more destruction and carelessness of the property (representing major violent crimes
in the whole neighborhood). Through the theory, Kelling and Wilson (1982) identified the
potential relationship between disorder and crime, meaning the continued allowance of
disorderly acts in public spaces would perpetuate more chaos and fear (Anderson, 2016). In
other words, disorder welcomes more severe, and eventually, violent crime; therefore, the
quicker that minor crimes or suspicions are addressed, the quicker a precedent is set for
reduced tolerance (known as zero-tolerance) for wrongdoing.
Broken Windows Theory initially began informing police practices in the mid 1980’s
when Kelling was hired by the New York Transit Authority as a consultant, allowing him to
push the introduction of the theory, which was adopted by former Commissioner William
(Bill) Bratton (Lorenz, 2010; Passavant, 2015) and fully implemented in New York City
under former mayor Rudy Giuliani in 1993. Under Giuliani’s leadership, when the New York
City Police Department (NYPD) implemented its neighborhood policing initiative on the
basis of the theory, the department increased by almost 30% over a ten-year period (Albrecht,
2011). During this time, the NYPD’s aim was to aggressively enforce minor ‘quality of life’
offenses (Macdonald & Braga, 2019) as a seemingly effective solution to law enforcement in
a time of high crime rates (Albrecht, 2011). This approach also appealed to residents’ requests
for higher policing of minor crimes (e.g., drinking or vandalism) with the expectation that, in
theory, it would reduce crime rates altogether. Supporters of the theory claimed that it was
- 183 Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2022
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through the Commissioner’s radical review of the NYPD’s standing and applied strategies
that violent and serious crime saw a decline of more than 80% since 1993 (Albrecht, 2011;
Friedersdorf, 2020).
Implementing Broken Windows Theory into Practice
As the underlying approach to NYPD policing and other communities across the nation, law
enforcement largely implemented the Broken Windows Theory into practice through ‘tough
on crime’ approaches and the use of stop-and-frisk policing. In 1996, officers were given the
authority to make ‘pretext stops’ which allowed them to stop someone for a particular
violation, even when the suspected wrongdoing lay elsewhere. For example, a police officer
might stop a person for a minor traffic infraction, yet the true intent was to search the vehicle
for drugs (Cooper, 2015). In New York City in particular, it was common for police officers
to arrest and charge someone with a misdemeanor when marijuana was found during a stopand-frisk, even when it became visible only by the search itself (Center for Constitutional
Rights, 2012; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2007). During this time, the threshold on what police could
do during a stop moved further in the direction of more aggressive new tactics; however, it is
important to note that the expansion of this form of bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 2010)
actually began a couple decades earlier.
In Terry v. Ohio (1968), the court’s opinion established that officers could
constitutionally conduct stops when they had “reasonable suspicion” that the suspect in
question was somehow connected to criminal activity, including a limited search if he or she
believed the suspect to be carrying a weapon that could either endanger the officer or the
general public (La Vigne et al., 2014). Whereas this was originally designed to be a minimally
invasive strategy (Cooper, 2015), subsequent court cases expanded the concept of ‘reasonable
suspicion’ to include factors such as an individual’s appearance and behavior, and gave way
for officers to confiscate drugs and other illicit substances found during frisks (that would
otherwise probably not have been discovered) and enter them as evidence (La Vigne et al.,
2014).
Due at least in part to this expanded opportunity for street-level bureaucratic decisionmaking (Lipsky, 2010), Broken Windows Theory has frequently been implemented in the
form of heavy surveillance tactics through the lens of hard crime-fighting as noted above.
Through the theory’s framework, police officers are able to subjectively identify ‘disordered’
areas or neighborhoods, and, at their bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 2010), utilize heavy
surveillance tactics in the form of requesting identification at will, issuing violation
documents, and/or making misdemeanor arrests (Stoudt et al., 2019). In addition to stop-andfrisk, heavy surveillance policing includes ‘vertical policing’, which derived from Operation
Safe Housing in 2004 under the leadership of former mayor Michael Bloomberg (Jefferson,
2016). Vertical policing involves police sweeping through lobbies, hallways, courtyards, and
rooftops of public and private housing, as well as increasing police presence in schools
(Stoudt et al., 2019).
However, such enforcement of low-level offenses often strains police-community
relationships and exacerbates mistrust (Eterno et al., 2016), which impairs police
effectiveness, legitimacy, and public safety as a whole (Epp et al., 2016; Kearns et al., 2020).
Moreover, when the police force does not represent the people that it is charged with
protecting, due to a lack of diversity among officers, we often see more discrimination and
violent outcomes stemming from police-civilian encounters, thereby further eroding trust
(Kennedy et al., 2017; Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2017). When people do not trust the police,
they are less likely to cooperate with police (Epp et al., 2016), such as by reporting crimes or
- 184 https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol29/iss1/10
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assisting in investigations, resulting in currently less than 40% of victims reporting their
experiences to police and less than 25% of offenses solved by an arrest (Neusteter & O’Toole,
2019).
Implications of Broken Windows Theory Implementation
While categories of major violent crime rates in New York City decreased as a result of stopand-frisk policing, what often went unmeasured was police-induced violence that resulted
from heavy surveillance of minor crimes (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2007; Jefferson, 2016). In
practice, the implemented patterns of stop-and-frisks have revealed that characteristics such
as racial demographics, income levels, and social disorganization are strong predictors of
race- and crime-specific stops (Fagan & Davies, 2000). With respect to vertical policing,
extant research has also found disproportionate negative implications for Black minors and
other minors of color (Fine et al., 2003; Kodelja, 2019; Musheno, 2016). Specifically, the
ways in which many community policing strategies were implemented have ultimately led to
increased police presence in poor communities and communities of color, often resulting in
harsher treatment and stricter punishment for minor crimes (Stoudt et al., 2019). More
specifically, youth in minority neighborhoods often feel mistreated by the police (Eterno et
al., 2016).
Despite recent calls to decriminalize small amounts of marijuana in public spaces,
arrests of this nature continue to disproportionately affect Black and Latino youth, compared
to White youth, even though drug use among the latter is often more prevalent (Center for
Constitutional Rights, 2012). For instance, the number of NYPD arrests for marijuana in
public view (MPV) increased from 3,000 in 1994 to over 50,000 in 2000, and up to about
30,000 by the mid-2000s, with most of the people arrested being ethnic minorities. Blacks
were 2.7 times more likely, and Hispanics 1.8 times more likely, to be detained than Whites
for an MPV arrest (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2007; Johnson et al., 2008). Moreover, of 685,724
stop-and-frisks conducted (not exclusively MPV), representing a 300% increase from 2003
to 2015, 84% were Black or Latino, 88% of stops involved neither an arrest nor a summons,
and stops that did involve the courts were often dismissed (Stoudt et al., 2019). Furthermore,
guns were found less than 0.2% of the time despite the NYPD Commissioner being adamant
that stop-and-frisks were critical to getting guns off the streets.
The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, under the U.S. Department of
Justice, produced a guide on community policing (2014), which found that minorities
experience police stops more negatively than Whites. Among low-income and racial minority
community members, stop-and-frisk strategies are now notorious for enhancing community
disorder and the threat of police violence towards these communities. Stops often result in
excessive police force, including getting slapped, thrown up against walls or onto the ground,
beat up, tased, or other physical attacks (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2012). And use of
force is more likely to occur when there is racial and gender incongruence between officers
and civilians, particularly when encounters occur between Black civilians and White officers
(Wright II & Headley, 2020). An analysis from the Prison Policy Initiative showed that in
2011, police used physical force in almost a quarter of stops or 130,000 times (Lenehan,
2017). Of these stops, 23% included Blacks and Latinos compared to 16% of Whites
(Lenehan, 2017). And, weapons (mostly knives) were found in only about 1% of the stops
involving Blacks and Latinos, while weapons were found on Whites nearly twice as often
(Lenehan, 2017). Moreover, “between 2004 and 2012, it took 143 stops of Blacks to lead to
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one seizure of contraband, 99 stops of Hispanics to lead to one seizure, and only 27 stops of
Whites to lead to one seizure, yet Whites comprised only 10% of all stops” (Passavant, 2015,
p. 335).
Though there are limitations in the data analyzed, one major issue that has been
observed from stop-and-frisks and arrests is the growing distrust and fear inside the
communities that police officers serve. As a result, the term ‘broken windows’ has become
widely scrutinized, and is often attributed to the racial disparities seen in cases of alleged
police brutality and arrests (Jefferson, 2016). As such, Kelling recently provided clarification
to the original intent of Broken Windows Theory by suggesting that “the police ought to
protect communities as well as individuals with proper training and supervision, and most
importantly, with a clear sense of limits, for officers to effectively maintain order and prevent
crime” (Neklason, 2019). As it relates to the ongoing stories of alleged police brutality in
present times, it raises questions on the intersectional effects that Broken Windows-based
policing will have long-term, particularly with respect to reinforcing current feelings of
civilian mistrust, fear, and/or helplessness.
Development of Mirrored Windows Theory
As police-civilian interactions currently stand, the onus continues to be placed on civilian
attitudes and behavior, but it is worth considering how Broken Windows Theory may be
applied to law enforcement officers. In his recent article in The Atlantic, Friedersdorf (2020)
revisited an argument by attorney Ken White that, by the logic of the Broken Windows
Theory, if tolerating broken windows escalates crime, what implication does tolerating the
police’s own broken windows and misconduct have? We believe this is an important question
to ask, because police officers allegedly killed 1,141 civilians by the end of 2021 and 145 in
the first few months of 2022 alone (Mapping Police Violence, 2021, 2022). And, while police
brutality is primarily recognized in police shootings and abuses of authority, it may also stem
from behaviors that create the sense that police officers do not respect the neighborhoods or
people they are supposed to protect (Friedersdorf, 2020). As such, Friedersdorf (2020) argued
that if police believe aggressive policing of communities is effective, it may be sensible to
suggest they be subjected to the same logic if there are multiple broken windows in their own
departments.
No known study to date has reversed the application of Broken Windows Theory and
used it to evaluate the use of force by police officers. As such, there is no pre-existing
theoretical framework or guide to follow for empirical model specification and hypothesis
testing. However, the extant research discussed above is useful for informing logic to
establish hypotheses. As previously explained, the primary focus of Broken Windows-based
policing is on the relationship between disorder and crime such that heavy surveillance tactics
and aggressive enforcement to deter minor crimes committed by civilians would reduce
disorder, chaos, and more severe or violent crimes within neighborhoods (Anderson, 2016;
Kelling & Wilson, 1982). One of the most common applications of heavy surveillance
policing, particularly in New York City, has been stop-and-frisk. However, the widespread
use and disproportionate implementation of stop-and-frisk policing in racial-minority and
low-income neighborhoods might also be seen to create disorder and chaos in the same vein
as civilians committing minor crimes.
In this theoretical context, heavy surveillance policing such as stop-and-frisk is viewed
as equivalent to minor ‘crimes’ symbolizing disorder for the neighborhood and its residents.
Following the logic of Broken Windows Theory would then suggest a possible connection
between such heavy surveillance police tactics and more severe or violent actions taken by
- 186 https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol29/iss1/10
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police such as the use of force, which I describe as Mirrored Windows Theory. In this regard,
the more frequent use of stop-and-frisk policing (similar to a greater frequency of minor
crimes committed by civilians) would result in a greater number of civilian-police
interactions, and, to the extent such interactions disproportionately occur within certain
neighborhoods or are motivated by targeting certain classes of individuals, would be seen by
residents as indicative of a lack of respect for their neighborhood and its people. If this is the
case, on the basis of Mirrored Windows Theory, such heavy surveillance police tactics would
logically lead to more careless and destructive behaviors of police officers (similar to more
violent crimes committed by civilians) such as greater use of physical force during encounters
with civilians.
H1: A greater frequency of stop-and-frisk incidents that do not involve the
use of physical force within a neighborhood will be positively correlated
with the frequency of actual use of physical force by police officers in that
neighborhood.
Thus far, the logic of Mirrored Windows Theory to evaluate the use of force by police
officers is based upon the critical assumption that heavy surveillance police tactics are seen
as disrespectful and chaotic by neighborhood residents. However, this may not always be the
case if stop-and-frisk incidents are valid or warranted, even if the frequencies of such
incidents disproportionately accumulate in certain neighborhoods or among certain classes of
individuals. As noted above, the widespread implementation of stop-and-frisk policing in
New York City in the early 1990s was often met with enthusiasm from residents desiring a
reduction in neighborhood crime, which did in fact happen during this time (Albrecht, 2011;
Friedersdorf, 2020). And, to the extent that heavy surveillance policing is warranted and does
not incite neighborhood disorder, then one would have no reason to believe such police tactics
would be related to more aggressive behavior or violent acts committed by police officers.
However, the newly released CCRB civilian complaint data can uniquely help with this
important assumption regarding the perception of neighborhood residents. With the ability to
measure the number of civilian complaints made against police officers within a
neighborhood, it is possible to directly determine the extent to which heavy surveillance
policing is perceived as unnecessary or excessive and therefore more likely to incite disorder
within neighborhoods and ultimately lead to more destructive or violent behaviors by police
officers during encounters with civilians. In addition, it is possible to measure civilian
complaints for which police officers are exonerated, meaning the complaint was investigated,
and it was determined by the CCRB that the alleged misconduct occurred but did not violate
NYPD rules. Such cases might also be indicative of disorder potentially leading to more
destructive behaviors by police officers, particularly if it is perceived that such misconduct
will not result in disciplinary actions against the officers.
H2: A greater frequency of civilian complaints within a neighborhood made against
police officers alleging inappropriate use of force will be positively correlated with
the frequency of actual use of physical force by police officers in that neighborhood.
H3: A greater frequency of civilian complaints within a neighborhood for which
police officers are exonerated from misconduct will be positively correlated with
the frequency of actual use of physical force by police officers in that neighborhood.
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If a connection between the use of heavy surveillance police tactics and more aggressive or
violent actions is found, suggesting evidence of Mirrored Windows Theory, then policy
prescriptions for advancing social justice may be more effective if focused on the initial
civilian-police interaction, perhaps leading to reductions in violent behaviors. This is
important in light of research that suggests the scope of authority with respect to police
oversight and accountability influences police performance regarding violent crime and lineof-duty homicides with broader scope effectively improving performance (Ali & NicholsonCrotty, 2021). These changes would, ideally, lead to greater trust and improved policecivilian relations as civilians begin to witness the presence of policing resources that are more
focused on civilian and community protection. The next sections offer an empirical test of
the Mirrored Windows Theory.
Data
To address the research question of whether heavy surveillance policing is related to the actual
use of physical force by police officers within the context of Mirrored Windows Theory, data
were obtained from three main sources, which are indicated for each variable summarized in
Table 1. First, data were collected directly from the New York Police Department on all stop,
question, and frisk incidents, along with data pertaining to the rates of several categories of
crimes that are used as neighborhood controls.1 All of the crime data are reported at the police
precinct-level, which is the lowest level of geographical observation available and is therefore
how NYC neighborhoods are defined for purposes of analysis. For the stop, question, and
frisk data reported at the incident level and used to test the first hypothesis, information
pertaining to the police precinct corresponding to the incident location that is provided in
these data is used to aggregate the data and determine the total number of stop-and-frisk
incidents per NYPD precinct per year. This same process is used to also determine the number
of incidents involving the actual use of physical force (including the officer’s use of hands,
pushing the suspect against a wall, pushing the suspect onto the ground, drawing a weapon,
pointing a weapon, using a baton, using handcuffs, using pepper spray, and other) per NYPD
precinct per year.
Second, data were obtained pertaining to all civilian complaints made against NYPD
police officers that were investigated by the New York City Civilian Complaint Review
Board (CCRB), which is the independent, civilian oversight agency charged with receiving,
investigating, mediating, hearing, finding, and making recommendations to the NYPD police
commissioner regarding complaints of excessive/unnecessary use of force, abuse of authority,
discourtesy, and/or use of offensive language. 2 Again, these data only became publicly
available in June 2020 when a judge lifted an order related to a NYPD union-backed lawsuit
that had previously prohibited the New York Civil Liberties Union from doing so (Durkin,
2020). These data are used to measure the aggregate number of civilian complaints alleging
excessive/unnecessary use of physical force made against police officers per NYPD precinct
per year to test the second hypothesis. It is important to keep in mind that these complaint
data include all civilian-police encounters and is not necessarily limited to stop-and-frisk
incidents.
1

Additional information on publicly available NYPD data can be found here:
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/index.page.
2
It should be noted that the CCRB data uniquely contain complaints made against police officers, which differ from
criminal complaints made against civilians that are reported to the NYPD. Additional information on the CCRB can
be found here: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/index.page.
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Finally, demographic information is incorporated to control for underlying
neighborhood characteristics, which were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. However,
these data are not reported or available at the NYPD police precinct-level. So, ArcMap
Geographical Information Software (GIS) was used to estimate the demographics of each
police precinct each year. To do so, the NYPD police precincts were mapped using a publicly
available shape file and then the 2010 U.S. Census blocks shape file for New York City was
overlaid to identify the NYPD police precinct in which each Census block is located. While
U.S. Census block boundaries are not necessarily coterminous with NYPD police precinct
boundaries, this is the lowest geographical level available for acquiring demographic data.
Since Census blocks are geographically much smaller than NYPD police precincts, most of
the Census blocks fall entirely within a single police precinct. For those Census blocks that
span across more than one police precinct, the first precinct found by ArcMap was used. With
the corresponding police precinct for each Census block identified, raw counts of
demographic information were collected on an annual basis using 5-year estimates from the
U.S. Census Bureau, and then the block-level data were aggregated to precinct-level by
summing the numbers. This provides for an estimation of the demographics of each NYPD
precinct each year.
Due to limits on data availability and, more importantly, comparability across police
precincts and over time3, these three data sources provide a panel of data for all 76 precincts
in years 2009–2012 and all 77 precincts in years 2013–2016.4 However, the panel represents
population data (not a sample) for the time period analyzed. NYPD police precincts are used
to represent NYC neighborhoods each year 2009–2016.
Figure 1 illustrates the trends over this time period of all stop-and-frisk incidents, those
incidents involving the use of physical force (both on the left-hand axis), and the total number
of civilian complaints alleging inappropriate use of force (on the right-hand access). A few
interesting trends in Figure 1 are worth noting. First, the trend lines pertaining to the total
number of stop-and-frisk incidents and the number of incidents involving the actual use of
physical force appear to follow a very similar pattern, albeit the numbers of physical-forceincidents are much lower. This clearly indicates that far less than 100% of stop-and-frisk
incidents devolve into a situation in which physical force is used by police officers. And, this
is also evidenced by the need to place the total number of civilian complaints alleging the use
of physical force, from civilians who felt the forced used during an encounter with police was
inappropriate or excessive, on its own axis since the numbers observed are much lower in
total. Again, this suggests that, by comparison, relatively few civilian-police encounters result
in civilian complaints of inappropriate use of force.
Figure 1 also shows a stark contrast in trends pertaining to incidents versus complaints.
As can be seen, the numbers of stop-and-frisk incidents and those involving actual physical
force both begin to decline precipitously in 2011 as there is a clear policy change during this
time regarding this particular form of policing. Regardless, however, after a modest decline
between 2011 and 2012, the number of civilian complaints alleging excessive physical force
used by police officers steadily increases throughout the remainder of the time period. Again,
it is important to keep in mind that these complaints include all civilian-police encounters and
3

The stop, question, and frisk data are available dating back to 2003; however, the way in which the information is
reported in these annual datasets changes over time. The time period selected for analysis is the longest possible
while ensuring these variables reflect the same comparable information each year.
4
Although the numerical descriptions of NYPD police precincts range from 1 to 123, this panel represents the
population of NYPD police precincts during the time period. For additional information:
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/find-your-precinct.page.
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions & Data Sources
Variable

Description & Data Source

Dependent Variable
Total number of stop-and-frisk incidents per NYPD precinct per year
involving the use of physical force, including: use of hands, pushing
Physical Force
suspect against a wall, pushing suspect onto the ground, drawing a
weapon, pointing a weapon, using a baton, using handcuffs, using
pepper spray, and other. Source: New York City Police Department.
Heavy Surveillance Policing
Other Stop-and-Frisks

Civilian Complaints

Exonerated Complaint
Dispositions

Total number of stop-and-frisk incidents that did not involve the use of
physical force per NYPD precinct per year. Source: New York City
Police Department.
Total number of civilian complaints alleging use of physical force made
against officers per NYPD precinct per year. Source: New York City
Civilian Complaint Review Board.
Total number of civilian complaints made against officers in which the
CCRB determined that the alleged misconduct occurred but did not
violate NYPD rules per NYPD precinct per year. Source: New York City
Civilian Complaint Review Board.

Underlying Neighborhood Crime
Criminal Trespassings

Total number of criminal trespassings per NYPD precinct per year.
Source: New York City Police Department.

Misdemeanor
Possessions Stolen
Goods

Total number of misdemeanor offenses involving possession of stolen
goods per NYPD precinct per year. Source: New York City Police
Department.

Aggravated Harassments

Total number of misdemeanor aggravated harassment offenses per
NYPD precinct per year. Source: New York City Police Department.

Total number of burglary offenses per NYPD precinct per year. Source:
New York City Police Department.
Underlying Neighborhood Demographics
Burglaries

Minority Population

GIS-estimated percentage of non-White population served per NYPD
precinct per year. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Bachelor's Degree

GIS-estimated percentage of population with a Bachelor's degree served
per NYPD precinct per year. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Low Poverty

GIS-estimated percentage of population with a ratio of income to
poverty level in the past 12 months of less than 100% per NYPD precinct
per year. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Total Population

GIS-estimated total population served per NYPD precinct per year.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
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Figure 1: NYPD Stop-and-Frisk, Use of Physical Force and Civilian complaints 2009-2016

not just stop-and-frisk incidents. A possible explanation for this trend is that civilians became
less fearful of reporting police misconduct. On the other hand, it might also be the case that
civilian complaints became more frivolous as a result of efforts of advocacy groups, legal
representatives, or increased national attention to police-civilian relations. As such, this
question warrants further investigation. The next section describes the econometric model
specification and estimation approach.
Model Specification & Methodology
Mirrored Windows Theory applied to the NYPD would suggest that a greater prevalence of
heavy surveillance tactics used by police officers, to the extent they create disorder for the
neighborhood and its residents, will lead to more aggressive or violent acts by police as their
lesser wrongdoings go unchecked (Friedersdorf, 2020). On this theoretical basis, the
prevalence of stop-and-frisk incidents involving the actual use of physical force (PF) is
estimated as a function of heavy surveillance policing (HS), underlying crime rates of the
neighborhoods (NYPD precincts) within which incidents occur (CR), and underlying
demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods (NC) as specified in Equation 1.
PF_it=α+HS_it β_1+CR_it β_2+NC_it β_3+ε_it

(1)

In equation 1, PFit is the aggregate number of stop-and-frisk incidents per NYPD
precinct per year involving the actual use of physical force, including: officers’ use of hands,
pushing a suspect against a wall, pushing a suspect onto the ground, drawing a weapon,
pointing a weapon, using a baton, using handcuffs, using pepper spray, and other. The vector
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HSit contains the independent variables of greatest interest, which include: 1) the total
number of stop-and-frisk incidents that did not involve the use of physical force per NYPD
precinct per year, 2) the aggregate number of civilian complaints alleging use of physical
force by police officers per NYPD precinct per year, and 3) the total number of civilian
complaints made against officers in which the CCRB determined that the alleged misconduct
occurred but did not violate NYPD rules per NYPD precinct per year. As previously
explained, each of these variables serve as indicators of heavy surveillance policing that
potentially creates disorder for the corresponding neighborhoods (NYPD precincts) and
civilians living within them. Based upon the previously stated hypotheses, it is expected that
the results will reveal positive correlations between each of these independent variables and
the dependent variable of the numbers of stop-and-frisk incidents involving the actual use of
physical force.
The final two vectors in Equation 1 include variables to control for underlying crime
rates of the neighborhoods (NYPD precincts) within which incidents occur (CRit) and
underlying demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods (NC it).5 In spite of efforts to
make police departments more racially and ethnically representative of the communities
being policed (Hong, 2017), it is important to control for these underlying trends as they
might influence police officers’ perceptions of a particular neighborhood, particularly related
to their level of respect for the area and its residents, which may motivate officers to use more
aggressive police tactics during encounters with civilians in these neighborhoods.
Specifically, measures are included for underlying crime that might be considered more of a
nuisance by requiring police response (e.g., criminal trespassing and misdemeanor possession
of stolen goods), as well as more serious crimes against persons and property that are
committed by civilians (e.g., aggravated harassments and burglaries) and therefore create
broken windows within the neighborhood outside of any police activity. All of these count
variables are reported at the police precinct-level each year. In addition, typical demographic
controls are included, which were estimated at the police precinct-level using the GIS process
explained earlier, to measure the percentage of residents within each neighborhood each year
who possess these characteristics (e.g., race, education, and poverty).
Since the dependent variable of the number of stop-and-frisk incidents involving the
actual use of physical force by police officers is a nonnegative count variable, using linear
regression for model estimation would likely produce inefficient, inconsistent, and biased
estimates (Long, 1997). In addition, the data comprise a panel and do not contain observations
of zero in the dependent variable. However, to address overdispersion, Equation 1 is
estimated using Conditional Fixed Effects Negative Binomial regression for panel data with
observed information matrix (OIM) standard errors.
Empirical Results
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Since the
dependent variable is a nonnegative count variable, the counts of most independent variables
(except for underlying neighborhood demographics) were also used, as opposed to
5

It should be noted that all other available crime categories were also tested, including: violations, misdemeanors,
shootings, and felonies. In addition, additional variables operationalizing neighborhood characteristics were tested,
including additional racial breakdowns of the neighborhoods. However, many of these variables are correlated with
each other, and many failed to reach statistical significance in the regression model. So, these vectors in Equation 1
include the most comprehensive set of variables possible while also ensuring that multicollinearity is not biasing the
regression results.
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standardizing them as percentages, for more parsimonious interpretation of the regression
results.6 As such, total population was also included as a control variable to account for the
uneven variation in the size of neighborhood precinct areas. As a reminder, all variables are
observed at the police precinct level each year 2009–2016.
As shown in Table 2, stop-and-frisk incidents involving police officers’ actual use of
physical force occur 1,157 times, on average, per NYPD police precinct per year. This number
varies from a minimum of only 4 incidents in precinct number 22 in 2016 involving physical
force to 10,874 incidents within neighborhood precinct number 44 in 2010, which was near
the peak of stop-and-frisk policing policy in New York City. On average, NYPD officers
made 3,212 stops that did not involve the use of physical force per precinct per year during
the time period, which ranged from a low of zero stops in precincts 18 in 2015 and 100 in
2016 to a high of 27,338 stops in precinct number 75 in 2009.
On the upside, the average number of civilian complaints alleging police officers’
inappropriate use of physical force, which covers all civilian-police encounters and is not
necessarily limited to stop-and-frisk incidents, is only six times per precinct per year. And,
while precinct number 75 had the most civilian complaints of excessive use of force in 2012
at 52, several precincts had zero complaints made by civilians against police officers alleging
inappropriate use of physical force. Although not shown, 42 NYPD police precincts observed
in the dataset had zero use of force complaints made against officers, and several of these had
zero complaints in more than one year. During the whole time period (2009–2016) those
neighborhood precincts with zero civilian complaints for the most years were numbers 22 (7
years), 26 (6 years), and 111 (7 years). Moreover, in terms of civilian complaints in which
police officers are exonerated, it occurs 6 times, on average, per precinct per year. However,
police officers in precinct 75 were exonerated from 59 civilian complaints in 2011, thereby
showing a nontrivial number of civilian complaints are found by the CCRB to be
unwarranted.
The remainder of the variables in Table 2 are control variables used to account for
underlying crime trends of NYC neighborhood precinct areas and demographic
characteristics of residents living in these areas.
Table 3 provides the Conditional Fixed Effects Negative Binomial regression results.
Overall, the model is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level (Wald ChiSquare=1,677.43; Prob>Chi-Square=0.0000). All of the independent variables are
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level or above. In Table 3, the columns
labeled as #3 and #4 provide the original regression coefficients and z-values, respectively,
with asterisks on the latter indicating significance levels. Column #5 provides the standard
deviation discrete changes, the calculations of which are based upon the differenced mean
6

As can be seen by the mean and standard deviation values in Table 2, the distributions of some of the count variables
included in the regression model are skewed due to the presence of outliers in the data. Of course, a common approach
for addressing such skewness is to standardize the data into ratios or transform the data into natural log form.
However, standardizing does not eliminate the skew, and logging the variables would result in a loss of at least 93
out of 612 (15.2%) observations. While it is common practice in econometrics to add a value of one to variables
before logging them to avoid losing observations with a value of zero, adding a value of one to the variables
measuring civilian complaints and exonerated complaint dispositions (two of the three independent variables of
greatest interest), which both have means of six and standard deviations of seven, would introduce a nontrivial
amount of measurement error to these variables. However, to ensure the robustness of the regression results, Equation
1 was also estimated by excluding the 27 observations with dependent variable values of more than two standard
deviations above the mean, and the results (available from the author upon request) were substantively unchanged.
As such, while the data analyzed represent population data (not a sample), the regression coefficients presented
herein might reflect less precision than without such skewness, which is a limitation of this study.
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and standard deviation values provided in columns #1 and #2, respectively, as a way to
interpret the regression coefficients (Long, 1997) with all values in column #5 reported in
percentage terms.7
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Physical Force
Heavy Surveillance Policing

1,157

1,603

4

10,874

Other Stop-and-Frisks

3,212

3,931

0

27,338

Civilian Complaints

6

7

0

52

Exonerated Complaint Dispositions

6

7

0

59

Underlying Neighborhood Crime
Criminal Trespassings

203

224

0

1,802

Misdemeanor Possessions Stolen Goods

26

20

0

133

Aggravated Harassments

334

164

1

998

Burglaries

226

114

1

657

Underlying Neighborhood Demographics
Minority Population
45.54%
Bachelor's Degree
18.69%

15.74%

10.16%

83.50%

4.94%

8.62%

34.64%

Low Poverty

18.44%

5.96%

5.32%

34.21%

1,343,977

1,110,056

49,839

5,771,638

Variable

Dependent Variable

Total Population

Note: N = 612 (t=8; i = 76 for years 2009-2012 & i = 77 for years 2013-2016)

The results in column #5 are interpreted as: For an increase of one standard deviation
from its mean of the independent variable of interest, the expected count in the dependent
variable increases/decreases by X%, holding all other variables constant. This interpretation
approach considers changes in each independent variable relative to how each variable is
measured and at levels that are likely to actually occur, while also accounting for the variation
in scaling of the independent variables (e.g., civilian complaint counts vs. total population vs.
percentage with a bachelor’s degree). As such, this approach reflects change values in the
independent variables that provides for strict comparison of the regression coefficients in
terms of magnitude of impact.
The regression results presented in Table 3 undoubtedly support the notion of the
7

Since the data are differenced during model estimation, it is important to base the interpretations of the regression
coefficients on the differenced means and standard deviations, as opposed to the original values reported in Table 2,
to avoid overestimating the magnitude of impact. This is especially imperative considering the nonstationary
downward trend over time in the frequencies of stop-and-frisk incidents (see Figure 1) as a reflection of the NYPD’s
policy change in 2011, as well as declining crime trends during the time period of this study. These downward trends
are evident in the differenced mean calculations, as several values in Table 3 are negative.
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Mirrored Windows Theory, which is the term coined herein to describe the reverse
application of Broken Windows Theory as suggested by Friedersdorf (2020) and empirically
tested in this analysis. Specifically, as the aggregate number of stop-and-frisks that do not
involve the use of physical force increases one standard deviation from its mean (n=1,407) in
a single precinct in a single year, one can expect the number of stop-and-frisk incidents
involving police officers’ actual use of physical force to increase by 17% per neighborhood
precinct per year on average, which is the highest magnitude of all variables used for analysis.
And, as the number of civilian complaints resulting in police officers being exonerated by the
CCRB increases one standard deviation from its mean (n=5), one can expect the number of
stop-and-frisk incidents involving police officers’ actual use of physical force to increase by
6.42% per neighborhood precinct per year on average. On the other hand, as the number of
civilian complaints alleging the use of inappropriate physical force by police officers
increases by one standard deviation from its mean (n=5) per police precinct per year on
average, one can expect a decrease in actual physical force used by police officers during
stop-and-frisk incidents of 4.84% per neighborhood precinct per year on average. This latter
finding is opposite of expectations and the stated hypothesis, thus might be more indicative
of civilian oversight of police officers rather than perceptions of inappropriate behaviors. As
such, this finding suggests that civilian complaints potentially provide broad accountability
that serves to improve police performance like what has been found in recent research (Ali &
Nicholson-Crotty, 2021).
Table 3: Conditional Fixed Effects1 Negative Binomial Regression Results of NYPD
Use of Physical Force
1

2

3

4

5

Differenced
Mean

Differenced
Standard
Deviation

Coefficient

z

Standard
Deviation
Discrete
Changes

-619.04

2025.78

0.0001116

16.31***

17.00%

Civilian Complaints

0.11

5.07

-0.0095843

-1.97**

-4.84%

Exonerated Complaint Dispositions

0.01

5.30

0.0117092

2.27**

6.42%

Criminal Trespassings

-14.70

101.12

0.0005811

3.70***

5.15%

Misdemeanor Possessions Stolen Goods

-1.46

15.31

0.0060184

4.10***

8.69%

Aggravated Harassments

-16.46

55.88

0.0026071

8.44***

10.82%

Burglaries

-0.06

0.20

0.0015463

3.51***

0.02%

Minority Population

37.87%

148.31%

-0.0459306

-10.66***

-8.20%

Bachelor's Degree

29.70%

73.34%

-0.0786888

-5.69***

-7.79%

Low Poverty

19.25%

84.46%

-0.0769943

-6.94***

-7.67%

Total Population

15,963

58,237

-0.0000002

-3.31***

-1.51%

Variable
Heavy Surveillance Policing
Other Stop-and-Frisks

Underlying Neighborhood Crime

Underlying Neighborhood Demographics

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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Wald Chi-Square = 1,677.43; Prob > Chi-Square = 0.0000; AIC = 7,493.51; BIC = 7,546.511
1
Fixed effects reflect police precincts.

It is important to keep in mind that these findings are robust even while controlling
for underlying crime rates and demographics in these neighborhood precincts each year.
However, it is important to reiterate the caveat that the use of stop-and-frisk as a policy
approach to community policing has nearly been abandoned by the NYPD, and the numbers
of stop-and-frisk incidents have precipitously declined since 2011 (see Figure 1). Still, this
punctuated change in policing policy in NYC only occurred within the past decade, and other
police departments across the nation have not necessarily followed suit.
In terms of underlying neighborhood crime, Table 3 shows that the broken windowsrelated crimes against persons and properties of criminal trespassing, possession of stolen
goods, aggravated harassments, and burglaries are all positively correlated with police
officers’ use of physical force. Specifically, as the number of criminal trespassings increases
one standard deviation from its mean (n=86) per precinct per year, the likelihood of police
officers using physical force during stop-and-frisk incidents increases by 5.15% on average.
A one-standard deviation increase from its mean of misdemeanor possessions of stolen goods
(n=14) is associated with an 8.69% increase in police officers’ use of physical force during
stop-and frisk incidents. Moreover, as the rate of aggravated harassments increases one
standard deviation from its mean (n=39) per precinct per year, the likelihood of officers using
physical force during stop-and-frisk incidents increases by 10.82% per precinct per year on
average, which is the second highest magnitude of all variables used for analysis.
Finally, Table 3 reveals both some expected and unexpected findings pertaining to
underlying neighborhood demographics and police officers’ use of physical force. In a
nutshell, race and income matter. According to column #5, as neighborhood precincts become
less stricken with poverty and more educated with bachelors’ degrees, the likelihood of police
officers using physical force during stop-and-frisk incidents declines by 7.67% and 7.79%,
respectively, on average. Taken together, these findings are consistent with earlier studies
indicating stop-and-frisk practices are motivated at least to some extent by socioeconomic
conditions (Fagan & Davies, 2000). So, future research examining the prevalence of police
officers’ use of physical force at the incident level of observation might shed further light on
these related poverty and education questions.
Unexpectedly, however, Table 3 shows that as the GIS-estimated percentage of nonWhite population in a neighborhood precinct increases one standard deviation from its mean,
the likelihood of police officers using physical force during stop-and-frisk incidents actually
decreases by 8.2% per precinct per year on average. Perhaps this is a reflection of the NYPD’s
policy shift away from stop-and-frisk policing and more dedicated efforts to incorporate racial
bias awareness into their training programs. On the other hand, this finding might also suggest
that NYPD officers are policing the civilian-induced broken windows in White
neighborhoods much more aggressively. Again, future research examining the prevalence of
police officers’ use of physical force at the incident level of observation might shed further
light on this race question.
Discussion & Policy Recommendations
It should be noted that a 2013 federal ruling found that New York’s aggressive use of stopand-frisk policing was racially discriminatory. Once the NYPD shifted away from stop-andfrisk as a heavy surveillance policing tactic, stops in the city dropped from averaging over
half a million stops a year to under 50,000 (Kramer & Remster, 2018). During this time,
NYPD also revised its training to promote more civil and less confrontational conduct during
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stops in efforts to reduce any observed racial disparities in police use of force (Kramer &
Remster, 2018). However, what must not be lost in these conversations intended to offer
evidence-based, practical, achievable policy solutions to this systemic problem of civilianpolice relations is the recurring narrative that, in recent times, a majority of police officers
feel less safe in the field (Ramirez et al., 2019). Consequently, conversations going forward
must address the pattern of mistrust and perception of safety on both sides of this divide.
To that end, civilians’ attitudes and perspectives of the police, and certainly their
willingness to cooperate with police, tend to directly relate to their level of trust (or lack
thereof) and the extent to which they see law enforcement in their community as legitimate.
And, police actions that are seen by civilians as unwarranted and/or racially motivated and
perhaps leading to greater civilian complaints (see Figure 1), lack of disciplinary
accountability (not the focus of this study), or other policing tactics that suggest low social
investment in the community (White & Kane, 2013) are indicative of Mirrored Windows
perpetuating community disorder. Minimizing the negative effects of heavy surveillance
policing (such as stop-and-frisk) is crucial, not only for improving police effectiveness, but
especially important for improving relations with communities of color (La Vigne et al.,
2014).
Although there is no easy or one-stop solution to this inherently complex issue of
police-civilian relations, the following policy recommendations are offered as an initial effort
to begin to repair some of the windows that have—figuratively and literally—been broken or
mirrored most recently. First, as it relates to applying Broken Windows Theory to the police,
which is termed Mirrored Windows Theory for purposes of this analysis, deterring more
aggressive interactions with police might require focusing more on the heavy surveillance
tactics undertaken by police that incite disorder and disrespect of communities, particularly
those in which ethnic minorities and lower-income civilians reside. While not the focus of
this study, an important step is to deconstruct the initial reasoning for any encounter between
police and civilians, particularly since arrests occur in less than 7% of stops. And, this might
require addressing police culture as a whole.
Better training can help clarify when and under what circumstances stops are
appropriate, legal, and well-justified (La Vigne et al., 2014), which may help to reduce the
need for discretionary street-level decision-making (Lipsky, 2010), as well as promote greater
accountability in adhering to procedures and in providing detailed documentation of
reasoning and context for civilian-police encounters. A major part of this training reform
should include addressing the way in which varying cultural mannerisms are perceived
through a law enforcement lens, which has proven problematic to people who do not conform
to white middle class modes of expression (Jefferson, 2016). Revisiting the ways in which
race and income levels are interpreted in relation to inherent criminality may open deeper
conversations between structural inequality and crime (Jefferson, 2016), and ideally lead to
reimagined approaches to community policing.
Although Friedersdorf (2020) called for the police to police themselves, in the same
way that civilians would not be entrusted to hold each other accountable against engaging in
petty crimes and other conduct that creates community disorder, it may also not be realistic
to suggest the police hold themselves accountable. For example, a major survey of police
officers on how misconduct is tolerated found that 52% believe “it is not unusual for a police
officer to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers,” and 61% of survey
respondents believe the police “do not always report even serious criminal violations that
involve the abuse of authority by fellow officers” (Friedersdorf, 2020). In addition, the NYPD
has experienced a persistent cycle of misconduct, scandal, and reform for decades (White &
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Kane, 2013), continuing to leave academics and practitioners alike anticipating which policy
or set of policies will prove to be both feasible and effective.
The culture of law enforcement starts during an officer’s training and persists
throughout his or her career, which may include the perspective that everyone outside of
policing is the enemy (Johnson & Cox, 2004), and often becomes reinforced by the limited
contact (outside of police patrol duties) with the communities that police officers serve. So,
unlearning the inherent criminality of civilians may be key (Bornstein et al., 2012). Kelling
and Wilson (1982) called for protection of the community and the individual, so it is logical
to wonder what influence the perspective of going into a community assuming its residents
are inherently criminal has on unwarranted use of force and other aggressive police tactics.
Especially since it is known that not all communities are policed equally, if unwarranted
tactics and/or unnecessary use of force go unchecked, then we are likely to continue to see
disorder and violence within our communities, as per the Mirrored Windows Theory and the
empirical test provided in this study.
Second, stemming from a concept first discussed in 2006, mandatory professional
liability insurance for officers is a model that is perhaps worth revisiting. In the same way
that doctors and lawyers are required to have it, this model offers a pathway to accountability
due to a series of bureaucratic avenues such as the Civil Service System, the courts,
decertification, civilian oversight, and even the use of body cameras, consistently falling short
(Ramirez et al., 2019). Critics of this model can rest assured that the stage at which it seeks
to intervene begins long before officers are met with critical, on-duty dilemmas, having
already priced out officers with demonstrated histories of racial bias or poor performance
(Ramirez et al., 2019). Justified use-of-force incidents would not raise premiums, as risk of
liability is only assessed based on civil-rights violations, so this approach does not call for
more or less policing, but rather, smarter policing (Ramirez et al., 2019). This could greatly
reduce the number of unnecessary interactions that police have with civilians, as the results
of this study show such encounters increase the likelihood of more forceful outcomes. In the
end, broken windows-based policing can work, but we cannot ignore Mirrored Windows that
also create community disorder. One promising example is the Orlando, Florida Police
Department’s (2020) recently created Community Oriented Policing Teams, which are
intended to focus on fostering positive interactions with residents. Rebuilding community
trust throughout our communities must begin with greater training and accountability, and
not necessarily with greater police presence in the streets.
Limitations
An obvious limitation of this study is that its scope only covers a single city. While population
data were used to analyze the longest time period possible, the results might not generalize to
all other cities. This single-city approach is appropriate and typical for the type of analysis
conducted and presented herein; however, the extent to which the findings from this study
are generalizable to other cities depends upon the reader’s consideration of the extent to which
NYPD police officers and the civilians they serve are representative of that which exist in
other cities. However, established in 1845, the NYPD is the largest and one of the oldest
municipal police departments in the U.S. and often serves as a leader in policing policy that
other jurisdictions seek to emulate. So, lessons can certainly be drawn from the findings of
this study and adapted to local policing jurisdictions throughout the nation.
Second, extant research has noted that in empirical analyses utilizing police data,
researchers must be cognizant of the fact that the data collected in itself likely has a degree
of self-selection bias. Specifically, civilian-police interactions are only observed and
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measured once a civilian is stopped by police, as opposed to just merely observed; therefore,
police data only contain actual interactions that trigger a reporting requirement (Knox et al.,
2020). In this analysis, an attempt was made to overcome this selection bias by focusing on
the neighborhood level as opposed to the incident level. At the neighborhood level of
observation, there are observations of zero in the variables measuring other stop-and-frisks,
civilian complaints alleging inappropriate use of force, and exonerated complaint
dispositions, which are the primary independent variables of interest. Still, this level of
observation clearly obfuscates some underlying factors that would perhaps be more clearly
indicated with an incident level of analysis, such as demographic characteristics observed at
the neighborhood level rather than incident-level. Even without the presence of selection bias,
however, the mere existence of racial disparities may not necessarily prove intent. A
disproportionate impact on minorities does not automatically mean that the NYPD has
engaged in premeditated and engrained racial discrimination (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2007). So,
future research should continue working toward overcoming such selection bias in order to
further shed light on this important policy and societal issue.
Policy Implications
The policy recommendations discussed above include the need for more comprehensive
training, as well as professional liability insurance for police officers, which are
recommended on the same basis as that required of doctors and attorneys: because of the
grave consequences to human quality of life if negligence ensues. Again, the NYPD is the
largest and one of the oldest municipal police forces with approximately 36,000 sworn
officers, 19,000 civilian staff, and serving a population of over 8 million people (City of New
York, 2020; Nussbaum, 2012; Reeves, 2011). As one of the most recognizable law
enforcement agencies in the world and highly reveled for their ‘quality of life’ policing
strategies, there are major national policy implications for a department of such status to be a
leader in reforming their approach to policing. In the same way that quality of life policing
once gained the NYPD great credibility and respect world-wide (Johnson et al., 2010), the
NYPD can do the same in piloting reform efforts that offer true systemic changes that have
impacted minority communities for a long time.
Directions for Future Research
The implication of unchecked Mirrored Windows is three-fold: It is conducive to police
officers’ own increased use of force and violence, it impairs effectiveness of public safety
through civilian mistrust, and it has the potential to alienate people (particularly minority
youth) leading to further civilian misconduct in the future (La Vigne et al., 2014). This
longstanding and complex issue may call for future research to study the generational effects
that mistrust in illegitimately perceived police forces will have on the decay of urban
communities. Do numbers in brutality and lethal outcomes continue to rise indefinitely? Do
communities begin to adopt means of their own protection against the police? Certainly, many
important questions remain.
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